The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true. Herman Cappelen The moral rights of the author have been asserted. First Edition published in Impression: 1. All rights reserved. No part of this. Liberating Content. The Inessential Indexical. Philosophy without Intuitions Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever Oxford University Press, forthcoming
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Sebastian marked it as to-read Aug 01, Centrality is supposed to be neutral on this issue, too.
Except where’s the soul? Ainar Miyata marked it as to-read Apr 28, Herman Cappelen University of Oslo.
Philosophy Without Intuitions – Herman Cappelen – Google Books
Forthcoming Philosophical Studies Symposium: He is the author of many papers and three books: Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: How is phi,osophy manifested? Sir marked it as to-read Aug 12, How Philosophers Use Intuition and ‘Intuition’.
He makes strange assumptions about justification such as that a justified claim cannot be puzzling or spark further investigation and blatantly misinterprets many of the cases – most egregiously in that he mixes up reasons that justify with reasons that explain why.
The thought experimenter can’t easily figure out why she made a particular intuitive judgment philosolhy.
Still, if your concern is to explore the radical hypothesis that a given field or research project here, in meta-philosophy doesn’t have a subject matter, you must surely be prepared to look beyond the specific descriptions, supposedly of it, that are offered by actual participants in that project — especially descriptions that look like non-starters when advanced as neutral common ground, relative to the questions and concerns that drive the project. This is why I hate analytic philosophy, as its formality leaves humanity hanging.
Read it and learn from it. Oxford University Withoht Amazon. It’s not entirely clear where the diagnostics end, and the features they’re supposed to be tracking begin, but this doesn’t really matter. So here’s a first stab at a general, minimal, characterization:.
I just wish that Cappelen had approached the indicated demarcation problem in a more straightforward and philosophically searching way: A Metamethodology of Intuitions. Especially on what they should say about it by way of initial gloss.
Selected pages Title Page. Nia Nymue marked it as to-read Dec 13, The indirect specification of the judgments’ contents allows us to leave open whether those contents should be paraphrased — and if so, how — when the problem cases they’re about are recognized to be non-actual. Later on, having ‘a distinctive phenomenology or etiology or both’ gets added to the original list Two Potential Problems with Philosophical Intuitions: Hardcoverpages.
Finally he really ought to consider the argument that philosophers are interested in some judgments simply because they are the kind of judgments people make pre-theoretically. Elmar added it Dec 01, No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen heman hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizin The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers.
What is the point? Not so cappleen about that.
Philosophy without Intuitions
For all I care we can even reserve ‘intuition’-talk for such states, if there hdrman any; Kim rated it really liked it Dec 25, By my lights, contemporary philosophical methodology could do with more awareness of this point and with more direct attempts to tackle it. Want to Read saving….
This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: Print Save Cite Email Share. Cappelen Between Rock and a Hard Place. It is a vivid and powerful call for philosophers to examine their assumptions about philosophy.
Philosophy Without Intuitions by Herman Cappelen
Lessons Learned, replies to objections, and comparison to Williamson Expecting Moral Philosophers to Be Reliable. But it didn’t have to end in this way. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide.